Quote:Regardless of whether a state actor was responsible, the potency of a threat like Havana Syndrome is primarily in the uncertainty it creates for U.S. government personnel deployed abroad and the bureaucratic time and energy that U.S. diplomatic and intelligence agencies must spend trying to muster a response with little information. Whether or not Havana Syndrome is a global phenomenon, whether it affected only two dozen people, or whether it affected no one at all is, in some ways, not the most important thing. An adversary needs only to create the perception that it has the ability to clandestinely use technology to harm U.S. personnel at U.S. embassies around the world for such a coercive attack to have its desired effect.

Quote:However, even with imperfect attribution, U.S. officials may use private threats to articulate precisely what they are reacting to and what they will do in response if the suspected behavior does not stop. For example, when CIA Director William Burns traveled to Moscow in December 2021, he raised the issue of the health incidents and said, “if Russia was found responsible, there would be consequences.”

Quote:In the case of Havana Syndrome or incidents with similar characteristics, the IC does not have information connecting the incidents to a perpetrator it feels sufficiently confident in to release publicly. The government may also be reluctant to release too much information to the public because doing so could reveal techniques for detecting and countering the attacks. If the government suspected an adversary in the attacks but did not have information to definitively accuse them publicly, U.S. officials could accuse the actor privately and leak that fact that they blamed them publicly—potentially the thinking behind New York Times reporting of CIA Director Burns’ private threat to Moscow on Havana Syndrome. In this way, the target could potentially gain some of the benefits of naming and shaming without having to admit outright that they were not fully confident in their accusation.

Quote:Demonstrators who participated in Hong Kong’s prodemocracy Umbrella Movement in 2014 were also attacked by alleged Chinese mafia members. The Chinese government has reportedly employed organized crime affiliates to similar effect in Taiwan, Australia, and Mainland China.

Chinese organized crime is also active in the international narcotics trade. The Chinese government does not disrupt the mafia’s control of the production and distribution of fentanyl’s precursors to other countries, including the United States (via Mexico), and Chinese organized crime is also central to trade-based money laundering schemes.

Beijing has disavowed any direct relationship with these groups and is, in fact, claims to be targeting Chinese mafia affiliates operating abroad via Chinese Ministry of State Security operations.

Despite these claims, it is clear that the Chinese government benefits from these groups, leveraging their networks to wield political inf luence abroad and also to support legitimate economic activity.

While target governments can pursue and prosecute criminal groups operating within their countries, assistance from the Chinese government is essential to cutting off domestic sources of funding and support. Beijing is reluctant to do so unless its direct economic or security interests are at stake. For example, through its legal front operations, Chinese organized crime provides services to Chinese businesses abroad connected with government officials and the Chinese Communist Party.

Motivation:
The Chinese mafia’s criminal activities typically align with the government’s own economic and organizational interests, making it difficult to determine whether the criminal networks are following Beijing’s directions.